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The Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court of Justice) decided to strike again. 
On 18 December 2014, for the second time in history, the Court rejected the European 
Union’s (EU) accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
1
 Although 
the judges do not seem to negate the idea as a matter of principle, they made the 
renegotiation of the Draft Accession Treaty very difficult, to say the least. The message 
sent by the Court of Justice to the Member States may have surprised some,
2
 but for many 
it was a rather expected development. The Court of Justice has always been a fierce 
defender and promoter of the autonomy of EU law. For that purpose, the procedure based 
on Article 218 (11) TFEU has been, among the others, the Court’s greatest weapon.
3
 Over 
the years a clear pattern has emerged: Whenever there is a threat to the autonomy and to 
the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, the judges will not shy away from taking bold decisions 
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1 Opinion 2/13 of the Court of 18 December 2014: Accession by the Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. See also View of Advocate General 
Kokott, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, Steve Peers; Daniel Halberstam;  Stian Øby 
Johansen; and Christoph Krenn in this edition of the German Law Journal. See also A. Łazowski and R.A. Wessel, 
The European Court of Justice Blocks the EU’s Accession to the ECHR, CEPS Commentary, 8 January 2015; 
http://www.ceps.eu/node/9942. 
2 It has been reported that the general feeling after the hearing was that the accession agreement was considered 
compatible with the EU Treaties. See S.O. Johansen, “Some thoughts on the ECJ hearing on the Draft EU-ECHR 
accession agreement”; http://blogg.uio.no/jus/smr/multirights/content/some-thoughts-on-the-ecj-hearing-on-
the-draft-eu-echr-accession-agreement-part-1-of-2. 
3 Other procedures may be of importance, too. A good example of the use of infraction procedure in such a 
context is Case C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345. 
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going against the will of the Member States.
4
 For obvious reasons, the raison d’être behind 
the Court’s decision is kept secret behind the doors of the deliberation rooms at Kirchberg 
in Luxembourg. Still, it cannot be denied that Opinion 2/13 shows that the Court of Justice 
will not give up its resistance to the ECHR accession so easily. In 1996, in Opinion 2/94, the 
Court held that the European Community, as the law stood then, had no competence to 
accede to ECHR.
5
 Now that Article 6(2) TEU provides for an obligation to accede, subject to 
conditions laid down in Protocol No 8 to the Founding Treaties, the Court has opted for 
strict interpretation of the latter, which, ultimately turns the caveats laid down therein into 
locks. It is clear that these caveats turned into locks are something that the judges will hold 
on to in the future and, by the same token, they will happily pursue interpretation that is 
very different from what the Member States intended when negotiating the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the Draft Accession Agreement.  
 
This article is divided into two main parts. It begins with an evaluation of Opinion 2/13 and 
the view of Advocate General Kokott as well as numerous submissions made by the 
Member States (Section B). This leads to Section C where the center of gravity moves to 
the future. On the one hand, the Member States of the European Union will, most likely, 
ask the other contracting parties to the ECHR to go back to the drawing board and re-start 
the negotiations aiming at meeting demands made by the Court of Justice. On the other 
hand, this prolonged road to accession will give the judges in Luxembourg an opportunity 
to develop further case law based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and make it less 
directly dependent on jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. This way, by the time the 
accession to the ECHR is eventually cleared by the Court of Justice, if ever, the EU legal 
order will be fortified enough with a wall of case law based on the Charter not to allow for 
undermining of autonomy of EU law. Arguably, the Court of Justice does not negate the 
need to protect the fundamental rights at the EU level. After all, it has been advocating this 
for quite a while now. However, one can easily see that the judges in Luxembourg prefer 
first to develop an internal system based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights before 
allowing for a more institutionalized external influence in this respect. This, as an idea, is 
prima facie sound and persuasive. Yet, it sits rather uncomfortably with the Court’s ruling 
in case C-399/11 Melloni, where the Court of Justice lowered the fundamental rights 
standards to protect the cornerstone of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, that is 
the principle of mutual recognition.
6
 All these issues are analyzed in turn. 
 
  
                                            
4 See Opinion 1/91 of the Court of 14 December 1991 on the European Economic Area, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490; 
Opinion 1/09 of the Court of 8 March 2011 on agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:123. 
5 Opinion 2/94 of the Court of 28 March 1996: Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140.  
6 Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107.  
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The evolution of EU fundamental rights is well known and prolifically documented in 
academic literature.
7
 For purposes of this article, we shall focus on a few rudimentary 
points that are crucial for the analysis that follows. To begin with, the original European 
Communities were meant to be economic endeavors only. Neither of the three founding 
treaties contained references to fundamental rights, which were to remain spécialité de la 
maison of the Council of Europe and its flagship legal instrument—the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Early in the 
evolution of the European Communities it became clear that fundamental rights were 
missing in the new emerging legal order
8
 but, due to the indecisiveness of political circles, 
it was ultimately the Court of Justice that took the initiative in this respect.
9
 It is unclear 
whether the judges in Luxembourg started to refer to the fundamental rights for the sake 
of protecting them or rather to defend the primacy of EC law.
10
 The judgment of the 
German Constitutional Tribunal in Internationale Handelsgesselshaft,
11
 where the German 
judges conditioned primacy of EC law over the Grundgesetz on the improved protection of 
fundamental rights in the EC, was a major catalyst in this respect. This was reflected in an 
increased number of references to fundamental rights, constitutional principles and the 
                                            
7 See, inter alia, M. Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 YEL (1981) 121; M. 
Mendelson, The Impact of European Community Law on the Implementation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 3 YEL (1983) 99; A Von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human 
Rights and the Core of the European Union, 37 CMLRev. (2000) 1307; I. Butler and O. De Schutter, Binding the EU 
to International Human Rights Law, 27 YEL (2008) 277; R. CA White, A New Era for Human Rights in the European 
Union?, 30 YEL (2011) 100; R. Schütze, Three ‘Bills of Rights’ for the European Union, Yearbook of European Law, 
30 YEL (2011) 131. 
8 The term ‘new legal order’ was coined by the Court of Justice in seminal judgment in case 26/62 Van Gend en 
Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. See further, inter alia, P Pescatore, “Van Gend en Loos, 3 February 1963 - A View from 
Within” in M P Maduro and L Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 
50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 3; B de Witte, “The Continuous Significance of Van 
Gend en Loos” in M P Maduro and L Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 9.  
9 Initially the Court of Justice approached this idea with fair amount of trepidation. It very early case-law it 
rejected outright references to fundamental rights (see Case 1/58 Friedrich Stork & Cie v High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, ECLI:EU:C:1959:4). This, however, changed in late 1960s when in Case 29/69 
Erich Stauder v City of Ulm - Sozialamt (ECLI:EU:C:1969:57) the Court of Justice famously ruled that “the provision 
at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles 
of Community Law [now Union law] and protected by the Court” (para. 7).  
10 J. Coppel, A. O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 29 CMLRev. (1992) 669. 
11 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel (No.2, BVL 
52/71) [1974] 2 CMLR 540. 
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ECHR itself in the Court’s jurisprudence that followed.
12
 The Court of Justice, step-by-step, 
established the foundations for the general principles of EC (now EU) law. 
 
Towards the late 1970s a proper discussion commenced on the possibility of accession of 
the European Communities to the ECHR. This culminated in the first attempt in the early 
1990s, which, as already mentioned in the introduction, was famously blocked by the 
Court of Justice in Opinion 2/94. In that case, the Court of Justice held that Article 235 EC 
Treaty was not a sufficient legal basis, therefore the European Community had no 
competence to proceed with accession to the ECHR. In the wake of this ruling the Member 
States were faced with at least three solutions. The first was to maintain the status quo 
and to allow the Court of Justice to proceed with development of fundamental rights qua 
general principles of law. The second was to develop the EU’s own bill of rights. The third 
option was to revise the Founding Treaties with the goal of providing an explicit legal basis 
for participation in the ECHR system. Out of the three, the first solution seemed to be the 
least persuasive. Not only was the case law of the Court of Justice developing 
incrementally and did not guarantee legal certainty, it also seemed not to be adequate 
enough to the Communities and the European Union in the post Treaty of Maastricht 
environment. The prevalent school of thought was that the Communities and the Union 
needed a catalogue of fundamental rights of one sort or another. This is how the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights was born. In the period between the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty 
of Lisbon it remained a non-binding instrument proclaimed by the presidents of three key 
EU institutions: The Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament.
13
 However, 
shortly after its adoption a first attempt to turn the Charter into a binding legal act was 
made by the drafters of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
14
 Shenanigans 
associated with its approval and ratification meant that it was only with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon that the Charter became binding.
15
 With the view of de-
Constitutionalizing the new revision Treaty, the Charter was taken out of its scope. At the 
same time a cross reference as to its binding effect and primary law status was inserted 
                                            
12 See, inter alia, Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:434; Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik 
Österreich, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333.  
13 More on the history of the Charter of Fundamental Rights see, inter alia, G. de Búrca, The drafting of the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 26 ELRev (2001) 126. 
14 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/2004, p. 1. See further, inter alia, J-C. Piris, The 
Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis, CUP 2006. 
15 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 [2007] OJ C306/1. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, J-C. Piris, The 
Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2010); Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty. Law, 
Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press 2010); Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout, Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU 
Law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012); Martin Trybus and Luca Rubini (eds), The Treaty of Lisbon and the 
Future of European Law and Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012). 
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into Article 6 TEU.
16
 Thus, the Charter became the EU’s bill of rights, albeit through the 
kitchen door, on 1 December 2009.
17
 Yet, the drafters of both the Constitution and 
subsequently of the Treaty of Lisbon, agreed it was also fitting to provide for accession of 
the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms. This is where the journey to Opinion 2/13 began. From the start it was 
rather obvious that the accession to ECHR would not be smooth by any stretch of the 




The legal basis for the accession to the ECHR is laid down in Article 6(2) TEU.
19
 The first 
thing that stands out is the language employed by the Treaty drafters. The provision in 
question provides that the EU “shall accede” to ECHR, which may give an impression that 
the European Union is under an obligation to do so. This is rather intriguing and may lead 
to divergent opinions. At best, it is lex imperfecta.
20
 It is well known that for a country or 
the EU to accede to the ECHR approval of non-EU contracting parties to the ECHR is 
necessary.
21
 Therefore, if one were to interpret Article 6 TEU as an obligation to accede, 
one would have to admit that the obligation was only on the EU to seek accession. 
Interestingly enough, this had been exactly the wording of Article 7(2) of the Draft 





                                            
16 P. Craig, The Treaty of Lisbon, process, architecture and substance, 33 ELRev (2008) 137, at 165. See also E.F. 
Defeis, The Treaty of Lisbon and Accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights, 
18 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (2011-2012) 387. 
17 This, as argued in the academic literature, has the same effect that it would have had had the Charter been 
formally part of the Founding Treaties. See M. Borowski, The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty on 
European Union in M. Trybus, L. Rubini (eds) “The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy”, 
Cheltenham-Northampton 2012, p. 200, at p. 208. 
18 For a comprehensive analysis see P. Gragl, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland, Oregon, 2013.  
19 Art. 6(2) TEU: “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms: Such accession shall not affect Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.” 
20 See Benoit-Rohmer, L’adhésion de l’Union à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 19 Journal de 
droit européen (2011) 285 (referred to in R. Barrata, Accession of the EU to the ECHR: the rationale for the ECJ’s 
prior involvement mechanism, 50 CMLRev. (2013) 1305). 
21 A brief reminder is fitting that originally the ECHR had been opened to participation of states only. However, 
Protocol No 14 to ECHR provides now for a possibility of EU’s accession. 
22 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 169/2003, p. 1. It should be noted, however, that 
Article I-9 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was signed a year later, provided for a 
straightforward obligation to accede (OJ C 310/2004, p. 1). 
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Of crucial importance are several caveats laid down in Article 6(2) TEU as well as in a tailor-
made Protocol 8 to the Founding Treaties.
23
 Furthermore, one should not leave aside a 
Declaration which is, too, annexed to the Founding Treaties. Because these caveats are of 
crucial importance for Opinion 2/13 and its analysis that follows later in this article it is 
pivotal at this stage to evaluate them in more detail.  
 
To begin with, Article 6(2) TEU provides that the accession to the ECHR “shall not affect the 
Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.” This is not surprising, bearing in mind 
how much attention the Member States pay to the doctrine of attributed powers that 
underpins the EU legal order. Article 1 of Protocol No 8 clarifies further that the Accession 
Agreement shall “make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union 
and Union law.” This, in particular, should include a modus operandi for division of liability 
for breaches of the ECHR between the EU and its Member States. Article 2 of the Protocol 
emphasizes again that the accession shall neither affect competences of the EU nor powers 
of its institutions. This repetition of a norm stemming anyhow from Article 6(2) TEU may be 
perceived as a sign of desperation of the Member States as if having such a caveat 
repeated twice in different parts of the Treaties were to strengthen its force. Article 2 of 
the Protocol further clarifies that accession to the ECHR does not affect:  
 
the situation of Member States in relation to the 
European Convention, in particular in relation to the 
Protocols thereto, measures taken by Member States 
derogating from the European Convention in 
accordance with Article 15 thereof and reservations to 
the European Convention made by Member States in 
accordance with Article 57 thereof.  
 
                                            
23 Protocol 8 provides: Article 1: “The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘European Convention’) provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union shall make provision for 
preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to: (a) the specific 
arrangements for the Union's possible participation in the control bodies of the European Convention; (b) the 
mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications are 
correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate. “ 
Article 2: “The agreement referred to in Article 1 shall ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the 
competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions. It shall ensure that nothing therein affects the 
situation of Member States in relation to the European Convention, in particular in relation to the Protocols 
thereto, measures taken by Member States derogating from the European Convention in accordance with Article 
15 thereof and reservations to the European Convention made by Member States in accordance with Article 57 
thereof.” 
Article 3: “Nothing in the agreement referred to in Article 1 shall affect Article 344 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.” 
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Last but not least, Article 3 of the Protocol aims a guaranteeing the immunity of Article 344 
TFEU to participation in the ECHR. Declaration No 2 on Article 6(2) TEU, annexed to the 
Final Act of IGC that prepared the Treaty of Lisbon, reiterates that accession to the ECHR 
should “preserve the specific features of Union law” and the need for reinforced dialogue 
between the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Strasbourg. 
 
Bearing in mind all those caveats the European Union started the preparatory work on 
negotiations soon after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. They were completed 
on 5 April 2013 when the negotiations of the Draft Accession Agreement and associated 
instruments were approved.
24
 Following that the European Commission requested opinion 
of the Court of Justice, as per Article 218(11) TFEU, on the compatibility with the Treaties 
of the Draft Accession Agreement.  
 
II. Silence Speaks Louder than Words? The Court of Justice and Division of Competences 
Between the EU and Member States après Accession to the ECHR 
 
Opinion 2/13 is prima facie rather long, but this in itself does not translate into robustness 
and completeness of the analysis conducted by the Court of Justice. As a matter of fact, 
large parts of the Opinion are limited to a descriptive overview of the ECHR, the Draft 
Accession Agreement as well as positions of the European Commission and the Member 
States—a majority of which submitted written and oral observations during the Court 
proceedings.
25
 As far as the substance is concerned, the center of gravity in the Court’s 
analysis is, not surprisingly, on the caveats laid down in Article 6 TEU and Protocol No 8. 
Further, what may take some by surprise, is the fact that the judges focused only on some 
but not all of them. Indeed, in sections of the Opinion devoted to the substance, the judges 
swiftly moved to matters pertinent to autonomy of EU law, which, without a shadow of the 
doubt, are close to the Court’s heart. Often the judges at Kirchberg made that point clear 
in the past and they equally do so in Opinion 2/13. This is discussed further below, but 
before this analysis addresses the autonomy of EU law it is interesting to delve deeper into 
what the judges left largely aside. This is particularly fitting as the Court of Justice skimmed 
though a matter that is of highest importance for the Member States. One of the desires of 
drafters of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and subsequently the Treaty 
of Lisbon, was to have a transparent delimitation of competences between the Member 
States and the European Union. This materialized in Articles 2-6 TFEU and, as mentioned 
above, for the purposes of accession to the ECHR in the already mentioned Article 6(2) TEU 
and Article 2 of Protocol 8. Both provide unequivocally that participation of the EU in the 
                                            
24 The package includes Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Draft Declaration by the EU made by the time of 
signature of the Accession Agreement, the Draft Rules to be added to the Rules of the Committee of Ministers.  
25 Paras. 3–143 of the Opinion. 
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ECHR framework should not affect in any way the competences of the European Union. 
The Member States had no intention of allowing the accession to the ECHR to serve as a 
kitchen door vehicle for increasing the of powers of the European Union. In her View the 
Advocate General Kokott engaged thoroughly in the analysis of the matter at hand to 
reach a conclusion that the Draft Accession Agreement in its current form does not change 
the competences transferred to the EU by its Member States.
26
 As already alluded to, the 
Court of Justice has largely stayed silent in this respect and focused on it only in the 
context of Article 344 TFEU and the co-respondent mechanism.
27
 Some key issues analysed 
by the Advocate General Kokott are not touched upon at all, for instance, whether as a 
result of accession to the ECHR competences of the EU curtail, extend or a transfer of 
further competences from the Member States to the EU is required. The question is how 
this should be interpreted. 
 
Again, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the deliberations are conducted behind the 
closed doors, which leaves a lot to commentators’ imaginations. The arguments that follow 
may contain some seeds of truth or they may amount only to pure speculation. Still, even if 
only for the purposes of intellectual exercise, it is worth drawing a couple of scenarios. One 
option is to assume that the Court of Justice used a decision to focus on faults of the Draft 
Accession Agreement, not on its strengths. It may well be that the judges implicitly 
followed the Advocate General Kokott and assumed that division of competences between 
the EU and its Member States, following accession to the ECHR, would be largely a non-
issue that would raise hardly any doubts sans one specific matter: Compatibility of the 
Draft Accession Agreement with Article 344 TFEU. The other option is that the Court of 
Justice assumed that because the Member States were ready to sign the Draft Accession 
Agreement and the Advocate General Kokott raised no doubts, it implied their approval to 
any consequences for the division of competences. Bearing that in mind the judges 
focused, as already argued, on their own priorities. Either way, it leaves one disappointed 
that the Court does not robustly address such a fundamental issue, even if it were to clear 
the ECHR accession in this respect. 
 
III. Autonomy of EU Law Revisited 
 
The reasoning of the Court starts with a number of preliminary points focusing on the 
idiosyncratic nature of the European Union and its legal order. Although the Court of 
Justice states the obvious, the judges found it appropriate to underline some 
fundamentals. Interestingly, the Court openly confirms that the European Union is not a 
State, yet at the same time emphasizes that the Treaties forming its legal foundation 
created “a new legal order,” the main characteristics of which are the doctrines of primacy 
                                            
26 See paras. 33-55 of the View of Advocate General Kokott. 
27 See infra Sections IV and V. 
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and direct effect.
28
 According to the judges, it is precisely the EU legal order that “has 
consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of accession to the ECHR.”
29
 
The Court then adds that “essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a structured 
network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and 
its Member States, and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged . . . ” in 




These proclamations are of fundamental importance for the analysis of the Court that 
follows. They serve as a point of departure for a series of powerful arguments that set the 
stage, or to put it differently, create a fortress EU. It seems as if the Court wishes to 
convey: This is our point of departure; this is where we stand. The judges are fully aware of 
the possibility that their rejection of the Draft Accession Agreement may be met with 
fierce criticism and accusations that the Court of Justice does not take fundamental rights 
seriously.
31
 This may explain why in paragraphs 169 through 177 the judges elaborate on 
the position of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, as well as the importance and 
status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As if to counterattack that alluded criticism, 
the Court of Justice argues that “[…] at the heart of that legal structure [of the EU] are the 
fundamental rights recognised by the Charter.”
32
 The scope of application of the Charter is 
referred to as well, though one may be taken by surprise that the Court goes back to the 
language of Article 51 of the Charter and argues that it applies when Member States “are 
implementing EU law.”
33
 This formula is rather unfortunate, not to mention differences 
between various language versions of the Charter,
34
 a different notion used in the 
Explanatory Note to the Charter,
35
 and the fact that the Court of Justice interpreted the 
provision in question in an extensive fashion in Fransson.
36
 Taking into account a recent 
                                            
28 Paras. 156-157 of the Opinion. 
29 Paras. 158 and 166 of the Opinion. 
30 Para. 167 of the Opinion. 
31 See, for instance, S. Peers, ‘The CJEU and the EU’s accession to the ECHR: a clear and present danger to human 
rights protection’, EU Law Analysis, 18 December 2014; http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2014/12/the-cjeu-and-
eus-accession-to-echr.html. 
32 Para. 169 of the Opinion. 
33 Para. 171 of the Opinion. 
34 For instance according the Polish version of the Charter it applies when Member States apply [“stosują”] EU 
law. 
35 It provides: “the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding 
on the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law”.  
36 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105. 
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judgment in Dano, in which the Court also uses Article 51 of the Charter verbatim,
37
 one 
may justifiably question if the judges are reverting to a more restrictive interpretation of 
that crucial provision.  
 
In this part of Opinion 2/13, the Court of Justice seems to attempt to square the respect for 
fundamental rights with objectives of the Union,
38
 the principle of loyal cooperation laid 
down in Article 4(3) TEU, and the obligations of the Member States stemming therefrom.
39
 
One of them is application and respect for EU law, which is supported by the Court of 
Justice and the national courts, whose task is to “ensure the full application of EU law in all 
Member States and to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under that law.”
40
 
Not surprisingly, the Court of Justice emphasizes the importance of the preliminary ruling 
procedure in this respect.
41
 As stressed by the Court, the autonomy that EU law receives 
vis-à-vis national laws of the Member States, as well as public international law, must be 
ensured.
42
 With that in mind, the Court of Justice in paragraph 178 of the opinion outlines 
the remit of its analysis.
43
 First, it checks if the Draft Accession Agreement is “liable 
adversely to affect the specific characteristics of EU law,” in particular “the autonomy of 
EU law in interpretation and application of fundamental rights, as recognised by EU law 
and notably by the Charter.” Second, the judges express a desire to verify that institutional 
modi operandi provided for in the Draft Accession Agreement comply with all caveats 
listed in Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol No 8.  
 
The evaluation of the Draft Accession Agreement starts here with three loud salvos. To 
begin with, the Court of Justice, rightly so, states that accession to ECHR would make the 
                                            
37 Case C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para. 87. 
38 Para. 172 of the Opinion. 
39 See on this principle, for instance, M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyal Co-operation in EU Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014. 
40 Para. 175 of the Opinion.  
41 See on the preliminary ruling, for instance, M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European 
Court of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 (2nd ed.). 
42 Para. 170 of the Opinion. See more generally on this question: J.W. van Rossem, ‘The EU at Crossroads: A 
Constitutional Inquiry into the Way International Law is Received within the EU Legal Order’, in E. Cannizzaro, P. 
Palchetti and R.A. Wessel (Eds.), International Law as Law of the European Union, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012, pp. 59-89. 
43 Para. 178 of the Opinion: “In order to take a position on the Commission’s request for an Opinion, it is 
important (i) to ascertain whether the agreement envisaged is liable adversely to affect the specific characteristics 
of EU law just outlined and, as the Commission itself has emphasised, the autonomy of EU law in the 
interpretation and application of fundamental rights, as recognised by EU law and notably by the Charter, and (ii) 
to consider whether the institutional and procedural machinery envisaged by that agreement ensures that the 
conditions in the Treaties for the EU’s accession to the ECHR are complied with.” 
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Convention a part of EU law and, at the same time, subject the EU to external control of 
compliance, in particular by the European Court of Human Rights. As already mentioned in 
this article, the Court of Justice has always been on full alert when the Member States and 
the EU attempt to sign an international agreement providing for another court. In the past, 
the opinion procedure based on Article 218 (11) TFEU, allowed the Court of Justice to 
eliminate such competitors ab initio. This happened with the EEA Court in opinion 1/91, 
the European Court of Human Rights in opinion 2/94, and most recently, the Community 
Patents Court in opinion 1/09. As if to justify its trepidation in this respect, the Court of 
Justice reiterates in paragraph 182 that subjecting the EU and the Court to an external 
judicial authority “is not, in principle, incompatible with EU law.” This, however, is subject 
to conditio sine qua non. Such an international agreement that provides for the existence 
of another court will be acceptable, and may affect the Court’s powers, “only if the 
indispensable conditions for safeguarding the essential character of those powers are 
satisfied and, consequently, there is no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal 
order.”
44
 It does not require a sophisticated legal analysis to realize that meeting such 
demands is almost impossible, especially because the Court of Justice turns this caveat into 
a lock in the paragraphs that follow. In the next step, the judges clarify that ECHR bodies, 
particularly the European Court of Human Rights, may not bind the EU, including its 
institutions, “to a particular interpretation of the rules of EU law.”
45
 If the EU were to 
accede to ECHR as per Draft Accession Agreement, the interpretation of the ECHR by the 
European Court of Human Rights would bind the Court of Justice but, as the judges 
explicitly admit, it would not be the other way round.
46
 This leads to a very interesting 
point regarding a potential judicial competition between the two Courts, particularly in 
relation to interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court of Justice 
unequivocally fortifies itself and argues that its counterpart in Strasbourg should not have 
the jurisdiction to challenge its findings as to the scope of EU law, which is crucial for 
determination if the Member States are bound by the EU’s fundamental rights.
47
 To put it 
differently, the Court of Justice will only clear the accession to the ECHR if it is guaranteed 
exclusive competence to determine whether EU law, particularly the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, applies and whether a particular case falls within the remit of the 
ECHR.  
 
As widely known, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is largely based on the ECHR.
48
 On the 
one hand, these provisions of the Charter which replicate the ECHR should be interpreted 
                                            
44 Para. 183 of the Opinion. 
45 Para 184 of the Opinion. 
46 Para. 185 of the Opinion. 
47 Para. 186 of the Opinion. 
48 See, for instance, S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (Eds.), The Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014. 
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taking into account the ECHR and case law of the Strasbourg Court.
49
 On the other hand, 
the Court of Justice arguably wishes to be the master of the game and to have the final 
word in interpreting the Charter. This, in the Court’s view, is a consequence of “[t]he fact 
that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own 
constitutional framework and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional 
structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation.” This supports the argument 
set forth in this article’s introduction that one of the aims of the Court may have been to 
delay the accession to the ECHR in order to build sufficient case law on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and not be directly exposed to the Strasbourg Court’s case law. The 
less-developed the Charter is, the more its interpretation would be influenced by 
Strasbourg rulings. 
 
The Court’s motives are even clearer in paragraphs 187 through 189, where it elaborates 
on contentious Article 53 of the Charter.
50
 Quite controversially, the Court of Justice in 
Melloni ruled that the provision in question should be interpreted in the following manner: 
“[T]he application of national standards of protection of fundamental rights must not 
compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter or the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of EU law.”
51
 This interpretation, however, does not sit comfortably with 
Article 53 of the ECHR. The latter allows the parties to the Convention to provide higher 
standards in their national laws than those of the Convention. Arguably, this could lead to 
a clash of titans. The Member States would be allowed to have higher standards as per 
ECHR but not as per the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This, in the eyes of the Court of 
Justice, would potentially affect the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law. Bearing 
this in mind, the Court of Justice makes in paragraph 189 a demand for a special 
arrangement.
52
 According to the judges, it is necessary to limit the powers of the Member 
States of the European Union under Article 53 ECHR so that the higher standards of 
fundamental rights protection can only be provided in national law in the areas where EU 
law does not apply.
53
 In the latter scenario, Article 53 ECHR would apply without 
restrictions. Although the Court of Justice diplomatically refers to a need for 
                                            
49 Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
50 See Bruno de Witte, Article 53, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. A Commentary, CH Beck-Hart-Nomos, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014, pp. 1523-1537. 
51 Para. 188 of the Opinion. 
52 Para 189 of the Opinion: “In so far as Article 53 of the ECHR essentially reserves the power of the Contracting 
Parties to lay down higher standards of protection of fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the ECHR, that 
provision should be coordinated with Article 53 of the Charter, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, so that the 
power granted to Member States by Article 53 of the ECHR is limited — with respect to the rights recognised by 
the Charter that correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR — to that which is necessary to ensure that the 
level of protection provided for by the Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not 
compromised.”. 
53 Ibidem. 
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“coordination” between Article 53 ECHR and Article 53 of the Charter, this essentially 
amounts to a request for an opt-out. Arguably, this issue will be one of the most difficult to 
deal with when re-negotiations of the Draft Accession Agreement commence. Needless to 
say, this would affect one of the pillars on which the ECHR is based and will most likely 
raise controversies. 
 
Creation of this major lock takes the Court of Justice back to the raison d’être behind its 
ruling in the Melloni case. In Melloni, the Court endeavored to balance fundamental rights 
and the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. As well-known, that principle is 
a cornerstone of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, including its flagship 
instrument the Council Framework Decision 584/2002/JHA on the European Arrest 
Warrant.
54
 It provides for a fast track, court-to-court procedure for surrender of individuals 
for the purposes of prosecution or execution of sentences.
55
 Following a revision of this 
Framework Decision in 2009, the power of national courts to refuse surrender is reduced, 
as far as perpetrators sentenced in absentia are concerned, only to cases when the 
accused was genuinely not aware of criminal proceedings pending against her or him in 
another Member State.
56
 This, however, did not entirely mesh with the Spanish 
Constitution’s fundamental rights standard. Therefore, the Court of Justice was asked to 
determine which system should prevail. The judges famously ruled that the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant is compatible with the EU’s fundamental rights 
standards, and furthermore, that both the Framework Decision and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights benefited from the doctrine of primacy over the Spanish Constitution. 
Had the latter been followed, it would have undermined the effectiveness of EU law, 
particularly the Council Framework Decision 584/2002/JHA on the European Arrest 
Warrant.  
 
This issue arose again in Opinion 2/13, where the Court of Justice turned to the principle of 
mutual trust, the basis and a prerequisite for mutual recognition. According to the Court, 
the fact that accession to the ECHR would also allow application of this Convention 
between the EU Member States when they act within the sphere of EU law could 
undermine the mutual trust by requiring the authorities to check compliance with 
fundamental rights by fellow Member States. From the perspective of the Court of Justice, 
it is “liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU 
                                            
54 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, OJ 2002 L 190/1. 
55 For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, N. Keijzer and E. van Sliedregt, eds., The European Arrest Warrant in 
Practice, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2009. 
56 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 
2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of 
persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence 
of the person concerned at the trial, OJ L 81/2009, p. 24. 
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law.”
57
 This is the second major lock developed by the Court of Justice, and the question of 
its interpretation remains. A narrow reading of paragraph 194 of the opinion implies that a 
tailor-made rule must be developed to exempt application of the ECHR between the 
Member States when mutual recognition instruments are at stake.
58
 Although the Court 
focuses strictly on criminal matters, the principle of mutual recognition based on mutual 
trust also applies in other areas falling under the umbrella of Area of Freedom, Security, 
and Justice. One must remember, however, that the principle of mutual recognition has its 
limits, and compliance with fundamental rights standards by the Member States is not fait 
accompli. The Court’s own judgment in case N.S. speaks for itself.
59
 A broad reading of 
paragraph 194 of the opinion may indicate that the Court demands non-application of the 
ECHR between the EU Member States when their relations are governed by EU law. Either 
way, negotiators must also address this issue when they revise the mandate for accession 
talks and eventually attempt to re-negotiate the Draft Accession Agreement. 
 
The third major objection made by the Court of Justice relates to ECHR Protocol 16, which 
provides for a modus operandi allowing national courts of ECHR parties to send requests 
for advisory opinions to the European Court of Human Rights.
60
 Interestingly, neither did 
Protocol 16 enter into force, nor did the European Union become a party to it. However, 
the Court of Justice opts for an ex ante attack, predicting a potential threat to the 
autonomy of EU law, particularly to the already mentioned preliminary ruling procedure 
based on Article 267 TFEU. The Court of Justice openly considers the lack of a provision 
determining the relationship between the two procedures as something that “is liable 
adversely to affect the autonomy and effectiveness” of the preliminary ruling.
61
 Alas, the 
judges fail to specify what this lock amounts to and what kind of a solution would satisfy 
the Court. The extreme, although very likely, expectation is a proviso explicitly excluding 
the availability of Protocol 16 modus operandi when EU law applies to a domestic case at 
hand. Any softer mechanism may not meet the Court’s expectations when (and if) it is 
asked again to clear the way for the EU’s accession to the ECHR.  
                                            
57 Para. 194 of the Opinion: “In so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to be 
considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not Member States of 
the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where such relations are governed by EU law, require 
a Member State to check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law 
imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to upset the underlying 
balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law.” 
58 Ibidem. 
59 Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N. S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. 
and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, M. Spreeuw, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The 
Application of Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust, 8 CYELP (2012) 505 
60 For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, P Gragl, (Judicial) love is not a one-way street: the EU preliminary 
reference procedure as a model for ECHR advisory opinions under draft Protocol No 16, 38(2) ELRev. (2013). 229 
61 Para. 199 of the Opinion. 
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On foregoing three grounds, the Court of Justice held in its interim conclusion that the 





IV. Article 344 TFEU 
 
The Court next addresses the compatibility of the Draft Accession Treaty with Article 344 
TFEU, which provides: “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for therein.” The Court has consistently used this provision to claim its exclusive 
jurisdiction whenever the interpretation or application of EU law is at stake.
63
 As previously 
explained, Article 6(2) TEU clearly states that the accession shall not affect the Union’s 
competences as defined in the Treaties. Furthermore, Article 3 of Protocol 8 confirms that 
nothing in the Agreement shall affect Article 344 TFEU. Therefore, this issue was clearly on 




Yet, Article 344 TFEU merely refers to Member States submitting a dispute. In that respect, 
the Commission argues that disputes between the Member States in the context of the 
ECHR would involve interpretation or application of the ECHR, rather than the EU 
Treaties.
65
 Obviously in cases where the content of ECHR and EU provisions is similar, 
Article 344 TFEU could be infringed.
66
 Therefore, a special provision on the inadmissibility 
of those disputes would not be necessary. This view was shared by Greece, but not by 
France, which argued that it must still remain possible for a Member State to appear as a 
third-party intervener in support of one or more of its nationals in a case against another 
Member State that is brought before the ECtHR, even where that other Member State is 




As already mentioned, the Court devotes several paragraphs to its exclusive jurisdiction, 
the autonomy of EU law, the legal structure of the EU (including fundamental rights), the 
                                            
62 Para. 200 of the Opinion. 
63 See for instance Opinions 1/91, EU:C:1991:490, paragraph 35, and 1/00, EU:C:2002:231, paragraphs 11 and 12; 
judgments in Commission v Ireland, C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345, paragraphs 123 and 136, and Joined Cases C-
402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 
EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 282. 
64 Para. 143 of the Opinion.  
65 Paras. 106-107 of the Opinion. 
66 Ibidem. 
67 Para. 143 of the Opinion. 
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obligations of the Member States (for instance, on the basis of the principle of sincere 
cooperation), and the need for consistency and uniformity in the interpretation of EU 
law.
68
 It concludes that “[f]undamental rights, as recognised in particular by the Charter, 
must therefore be interpreted and applied within the EU in accordance with [this] 
constitutional framework.”
69
 While this conclusion should not come as a surprise, given the 
fact that Article 344 TFEU was referred to in the Treaty (as well as in Protocols and 
Declarations), it remains difficult to square these starting points with the notion—which is 
at the heart of the Strasbourg system—that external judicial control is to be accepted once 
a violation of ECHR provisions is at stake. In fact, the two Courts have debated this issue 
during the accession process.
70
 For instance, in a joint communication from Presidents 
Costa and Skouris (24 January 2011), the parties recognized that “[a]s a result of that 
accession, the acts of the EU will be subject, like those of the other High Contracting 
Parties, to the review exercised by the ECtHR in the light of the rights guaranteed under 
the Convention.”
71
 The Presidents pointed to two situations: First, direct actions, in which 
case the CJEU would have a chance to rule; and second, cases on EU law 
application/interpretation before domestic courts, where in the absence of a preliminary 
question, the CJEU would not be in a position to review the consistency of that law with 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. While the 
Presidents argued that such a “situation should not arise often,” they nevertheless 
proposed “a procedure . . . , in connection with the accession of the EU to the Convention, 
which is flexible and would ensure that the CJEU may carry out an internal review before 
the ECHR carries out external review.”
72
 They found in a solution in a prior involvement 
procedure, laid down in Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement. Ironically, this 




It is notable that the CJEU previously pointed to these issues during earlier stages. In a 
2010 discussion document it argued that “the Union must make sure . . . that external 
                                            
68 Paras. 163-174 of the Opinion. 
69 Para. 177 of the Opinion. 
70 See more extensively on the role of the two European courts in the accession negotiations L.F.M. Besselink, 
‘Should the European Union Ratify the European Convention on Human Rights? Some Remarks on the Relations 
between the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice’, in A. Føllesdal, B. Peters & G. 
Ulfstein (eds.), Constituting Europe: the European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global 
Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301-333. 
71 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf (last 
accessed on 15 January 2015) [at 1]. 
72 Ibidem. 
73 See infra Section VI. 
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review by the Convention institutions can be preceded by effective internal review by the 
courts of the Member States and/or of the Union.”
 74
 The Court added that:  
 
[t]o maintain uniformity in the application of European 
Union law and to guarantee the necessary coherence of 
the Union’s system of judicial protection, it is therefore 
for the Court of Justice alone, in an appropriate case, to 
declare an act of the Union invalid. . . . In order to 
preserve this characteristic of the Union’s system of 
judicial protection, the possibility must be avoided of 
the European Court of Human Rights being called on to 
decide on the conformity of an act of the Union with 
the Convention without the Court of Justice first having 





Hence, the Court has been quite consistent in pointing out some of the consequences of 
Article 344 TFEU. Yet the interpretation of this provision now seems to affect the very idea 
of joining the ECHR. As argued above, for all other parties to the Convention, being bound 
by the fundamental rights in the ECHR in the exercise of their internal powers is the very 
essence of joining the system in the first place. While the Court seems to acknowledge this 
in paragraph 185 of the opinion, it nevertheless maintains that “it should not be possible 
for the ECHR to call into question the Court’s findings in relation to the scope ratione 
materiae of EU law, for the purposes, in particular, of determining whether a Member 




One particular problem in this respect is related to Article 55 of the ECHR, which, in a way, 
is the counterpart of Article 344 TFEU. It reads:  
 
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by 
special agreement, they will not avail themselves of 
treaties, conventions or declarations in force between 
them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, 
a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application 
                                            
74 Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
para. 7, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_en.pdf. 
75 Paras. 7-9. 
76 Para. 186 of the Opinion. 
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of this Convention to a means of settlement other than 
those provided for in this Convention.  
 
The tension is obvious: Article 344 TFEU calls upon Member States to only bring disputes 
concerning EU law before the Court of Justice, whereas Article 55 ECHR demands a 
settlement of disputes relating to the ECHR before the ECtHR by means of the inter-State 
cases procedure (Article 33 ECHR). How can this be reconciled, particularly when the ECHR 




This provision is explicitly dealt with in Article 5 of the Draft Accession Agreement. It 
provides: “Proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be 
understood as constituting neither procedures of national investigation or settlement 
within the meaning of Article 35, paragraph 2.b, of the Convention, nor means of dispute 
settlement within the meaning of Article 55 of the Convention.” Basically, the solution is 
that the inter-State cases procedure under Article 33 ECHR is not mandatory, and the EU 
and its Member States may continue to bring before the EU Courts any disputes arising out 
of interpretation and application of the ECHR. Yet in the eyes of the Court, this is not 
sufficient to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction. The provision still allows for the possibility 
that the EU or Member States might submit an application to the ECHR concerning an 
alleged violation by a Member State or the EU, respectively, in conjunction with EU law. 
This, according to the Court, forms a violation of Article 344 TFEU. The fundamental basis 
of this objection is reflected in the statement made by the Court that this “goes against the 
very nature of EU law.”
78
 To overcome this problem, one would need an “express exclusion 
of the ECHR’s jurisdiction under Article 33 of the ECHR over disputes between Member 
States or between Member States and the EU in relation to the application of the ECHR 
within the scope ratione materiae of EU law.”
79
 In other words—as noted by the Advocate 
General Kokott—a rule would be needed by which Article 344 TFEU would be unaffected 
by, and take precedence over, Article 33 ECHR (implying inadmissibility of a claim in a case 




                                            
77 See on this issue also P. Eeckhout, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
an Integral Part of EU Law – Some Reflections’, in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege, S. Adam (Eds.), The 
European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2013, pp. 87-99. See more in general on the relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe: E. Cornu, 
‘The Impact of Council of Europe Standards on the European Union’, in R.A. Wessel and S. Blockmans (eds.), 
Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order Under the Influence of International Organisations, The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press/Springer, 2013, pp. 113-129. 
78 Para. 212 of the Opinion. 
79 Para. 213 of the Opinion. 
80 Para. 115 of the View of Advocate General Kokott.. 
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The problem therefore flows from the risk that the application and interpretation of 
internal EU law (in disputes between Member States inter se or between Member States 
and the Union) will be by-passed. Though, one must also consider the extent of this risk. 
Member States are well aware of the Court’s case law on this point, and the issue could 




V. The Co-Respondent Mechanism 
 
While the Court emphasizes that the EU is not a state—a fact, but nevertheless a 
novum
82
—and that the special characteristics of the EU have not been taken into account, 
one cannot maintain that there has been no discussion. In fact, the special situation of the 
accession of an organization with a complex division of competences was at the heart of 
the debates over the past years.
83
 This, for instance, led to the introduction of the so-called 
“co-respondent mechanism” to ensure that proceedings brought before the ECtHR by non-
                                            
81 The Advocate General Kokott mentioned the possibility used in Article 282 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (para. 115 of the View). Kuijper refers to the example of Annex 2 of the UNESCO Convention 
on cultural diversity, which states that the Member States of the Union which are party to the Convention (next 
to the EU itself) will apply the provisions of the agreement in question in their mutual relations in accordance with 
the Union’s internal rules and without prejudice to appropriate amendments being made to these rules. P.J. 
Kuijper, ‘Reaction to Leonard Besselink’s ACELG Blog’, 6 January 2015; 
http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/01/06/reaction-to-leonard-besselinks’s-acelg-blog/. 
82 The discussion on this is well known and the most popular conclusory qualification still seems to be that the EU 
is a sui generis entity. The Court refers to this when it argues:  
The fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of 
which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework and 
founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure 
and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation, has consequences 
as regards the procedure for and conditions of accession to the ECHR.  
(para. 158 of the Opinion). See recently on this discussion C. Eckes and R.A. Wessel, ‘The European Union: An 
International Perspective’, in T. Tridimas and R. Schütze (Eds.), The Oxford Principles of European Union Law − 
Volume 1: The European Union Legal Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 (forthcoming). 
83 See, inter alia, P. Gragl, op. cit. n. 18; J.P. Jacqué, The Accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 48 CMLRev. (2011), 995-1023; C. Timmermans, 
‘Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe Before and After Accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention of Human Rights’, in M. van Roosmalen et al. (eds.), Fundamental Rights and Principles: Liber 
Amicorum Pieter van Dijk, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2013; P. Polakiewicz, ‘The European Union’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights: Competition or Coherence in Fundamental 
Rights Protection in Europe’, 14 Revue européenne de droit public (2002), 853-878; T. Lock, EU Accession to the 
ECHR: Implications for the Judicial Review in Strasbourg, 35 European Law Review (2010), 777-798; T. Lock, The 
ECJ and the ECHR: The Future Relationship Between the Two European Courts, 8 Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals, (2009), 375-398; as well as the contributions to J. Iliopoulos-Strangas, V. Pereira da Silva and 
P. Potacs (eds.), Der Beitrit der Europäischen Union zur EMRK: die Auswirkung auf den Schutz der Grunrechte in 
Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013. 
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EU-Member States and individual applications would be correctly addressed to Member 




The co-respondent mechanism—laid down in Article 3 of the Draft Accession Agreement—
foresees the following possibility:  
 
The European Union or a member State of the 
European Union may become a co-respondent to 
proceedings by decision of the Court in the 
circumstances set out in the Agreement on the 
Accession of the European Union to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The 
admissibility of an application shall be assessed without 
regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the 
proceedings. 
 
This provision can be understood in the light of the complex, and dynamic, division of 
competences between the Union and its Member States. Yet, this mechanism also allows 
the ECtHR to implicitly decide on the division of competences between the EU and its 
Member States. In doing so, the ECtHR would have to interpret EU law, something that 
Court of Justice believes can only be done in Luxembourg. Admittedly, the Court of Justice 
makes a valid point. As we have seen, Article 344 of the TFEU aims to preserve the 
autonomy of the EU legal system and the Court is obliged to safeguard this principle.
85
 
And, as noted in Section B.I, Protocol No. 8 was created to explicitly address these issues. 
 
The Court sees three problems. First, once the EU or Member States request leave to 
intervene as co-respondents in a case before the ECtHR, they must give reasons from 
which it can be established that the conditions for their participation in the procedure are 
met, and the ECtHR is to decide on that request in the light of the plausibility of those 
reasons. This will give the ECtHR the possibility of interfering with the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States. Second, in the end, the EU and the Member States 
may be held jointly responsible. Yet, a Member State may have made a reservation in 
relation to the issue under review, which would imply a violation of Article 2 of EU Protocol 
No. 8, according to which the Accession Agreement must ensure that nothing therein 
affects the situation of Member States in relation to the ECHR. Third, in situations of joint 
responsibility, the ECHR may decide that only one of them is to be held responsible for that 
                                            
84 See further, inter alia, P. Gragl, op. cit. n. 18, at pp. 138-173; as well as C. Eckes, EU Accession to the ECHR: 
Between Autonomy and Adaptation, 76 Modern Law Review (2013), 254-285, at 267. 
85 For the text of Article 344 TFEU see supra section IV. 
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violation. Again, this would imply an assessment of the rules of EU law governing the 
division of powers between the EU and its Member States. 
 
A first assessment of these arguments leads us to conclude that the Court may be overly 
cautious. This would not be the first time that a “foreign jurisdiction” has had an opinion 
on the division of competences and responsibilities between the EU and its Member 
States. The best example is provided by the WTO, where the division of competences is not 
even followed consistently as to fit the WTO’s judicial framework best. And, in the end, the 
Union would even be able to argue—in line with the Kadi cases—that in the 
implementation it is bound by its own constitutional rules as long as it remains within the 
limits of its international obligations. More importantly, however, is that the argument 
seems flawed in principle. Shutting out a role of an external court whenever the 
interpretation of Union law is at stake could violate the very idea of the Strasbourg system. 
Joining that system implies some vulnerability as well as an acceptance of the fact that one 
will no longer by definition have the final say on interpretation of internal law in the light 
of obligations laid down in the Convention. 
 
VI. Prior Involvement Procedure 
 
One of the issues raised in the negotiations was the creation of a prior involvement 
procedure, allowing the Court of Justice to assess the compatibility of EU law with ECHR 
law before it is dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights in a case where the EU 
acts as a co-respondent and the Court of Justice has not had a prior opportunity to make 
such an assessment.
86
 Article 3, paragraph 6 of the Draft Accession Agreement lays down 
the basic parameters of this procedure while further details are purely a matter of EU law 
for the European Union to regulate internally. This provision provides, inter alia, that such 
a procedure should facilitate a quick assessment to avoid further delays at the European 
Court of Human Rights and that the procedure will not affect the latter’s powers. There is 
some controversy surrounding a decision regarding how to regulate such modus operandi 
and in which legal act. For instance, the European Commission—in its submission to the 
Court of Justice—argued that the prior involvement could be regulated in the Council 
Decision concluding the Accession Agreement as per Article 218(6)(a)(ii) of the TFEU.
87
 The 
Dutch government argued in its pleadings, however, that for this purpose a revision of the 
Statute of the Court of Justice was more fitting.
88
 Several governments that intervened in 
the Court proceedings agreed that the introduction of the prior involvement procedure 
                                            
86 See further R. Baratta, op. cit. n. 20. 
87 Para. 92 of the Opinion. 
88 Para. 139 of the Opinion. 
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would confer additional powers on the Court of Justice, yet no prior amendment of the 




The prior involvement mechanism, as regulated in the Draft Accession Agreement, did not 
survive the Court’s scrutiny on two grounds. To begin with, a conditio sine qua non for the 
Court of Justice is that the EU institution takes a decision if the Court of Justice has given a 
prior ruling on the matter in question.
90
 Needless to say, this decision is crucial because it 
will trigger the prior involvement mechanism. According to the Court of Justice, such a 
decision should not belong to the European Court of Human Rights because it would 
cover—by its jurisdiction—interpretation of case law originating at Kirchberg in 
Luxembourg.
91
 The second objection deals with the substance of such procedure. Article 
3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement employs a rather vague term: “[C]ompatibility with 
the Convention rights at issue of the provision of European Union law.” The Draft 
Explanatory Note provides, however, a clarification. According to the note, the procedure 
would extend to the interpretation of primary law and the validity of secondary legislation. 
It is the latter point that raised the objections of both the Advocate General Kokott and the 
Court of Justice. While the Advocate General was willing to give a green light to the 
solution at hand—providing a clarification that the procedure would also cover 
interpretation of secondary legislation
92
—the Court of Justice dismissed outright the 
proposed arrangement. According to the judges, Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession 
Agreement—as interpreted in the Explanatory note—is also adversely affecting the 




VII. Accession to the ECHR and Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
One specific argument used by the Court concerns the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), an area in which it has limited jurisdiction. By stating that “certain acts 
adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review by the Court of 
Justice,”
94
 the Court of Justice expresses its displeasure with the idea that the ECtHR would 
be able to rule on the compatibility with the ECHR of “certain acts, actions or omissions 
performed in the context of the CFSP.”
95
 The extent to which the Court of Justice has the 
                                            
89 Para. 137 of the Opinion. 
90 Para. 241 of the Opinion. 
91 Para. 239 of the Opinion. 
92 Paras. 124-135 of the View of Advocate General Kokott. 
93 Paras. 236-248 of the Opinion. 
94 Para. 252 of the Opinion. 
95 Para. 254 of the Opinion. 
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competence to rule on CFSP issues has been widely debated over the years.
96
 While there 
are clear limitations to the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court correctly stated it is not the case 
that CFSP in its entirety would be immune to legal scrutiny.
97
 Interestingly, it does not wish 
to give a final say on the scope of its jurisdiction. In particular, in relation to Article 275 
TFEU—allowing for a review of the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V 
of the EU Treaty—the Court keeps its options open: “[T]he Court has not yet had the 
opportunity to define the extent to which its jurisdiction is limited in CFSP matters as a 




Advocate General Kokott also referred to the issue when she argued that “accession to the 
ECHR will undoubtedly mean that the EU must respect the fundamental rights protection 
that stems from the ECHR—and thus also the requirement of effective legal protection in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 13 ECHR—in all its spheres of activity, including the CFSP.”
99
 
She also raised the key question of whether the legal protection in the CFSP afforded by 
the EU legal order can be regarded as effective legal protection for the purposes of Articles 
6 and 13 of the ECHR. The Commission’s view on this is equally interesting:  
 
It proposes that [Article 275 TFEU] be understood as 
meaning that the Court of Justice of the EU not only 
has jurisdiction over actions for annulment brought by 
individuals against restrictive measures, but it may in 
addition deal with actions for damages and reply to 
requests for preliminary rulings from national courts or 
tribunals in the sphere of the CFSP. It also advocates 
                                            
96 See C. Hillion, ‘A Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, 
in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds), The ECJ and External Relations: Constitutional Challenges, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing (2014); R.A. Wessel, ‘Resisting Legal Facts: Are CFSP Norms as Soft as They Seem?’, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 2015 (forthcoming); S. Griller, ‘The Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, 
in A. Rosas, E. Levits and Y. Bot (Eds), Court of Justice of the European Union - Cour de Justice de l’Union 
Européene, The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-
law - La Cour de Justice et la Construction de l’Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence, 
The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press (2013) pp. 675-692; G. De Baere and P. Koutrakos, ‘The Interactions between the 
Legislature and the Judiciary in EU External Relations’ in P. Syrpis (Ed.), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU 
Internal Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2012), pp. 243-273; L. Saltinyté, ‘Jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice over issues relations to the Common Foreign and Security Policy under the Lisbon 
Treaty’, 119 Jurisprudence (2010), 261; A. Hinarejos, Judicial Control in the European Union – Reforming 
Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillars, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009). 
97 See in particular C. Hillion, ‘A Powerless Court?’, op. cit. n. 96 and R.A. Wessel ‘Resisting Legal Facts’, op. cit. n. 
96. 
98 Para. 251 of the Opinion. 
99 Para. 83 of the Opinion. 
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handling the options for the legal protection of 
individuals in the CFSP in such a way as to cover not 
only acts, within the meaning of the first paragraph of 
Article 263 TFEU, which produce binding legal effects, 
but also mere ‘material acts’ (Realakte), that is to say, 




While the Commission may be complemented for its daring view that in certain 
interpretations the extended jurisdiction of the Court indeed seems to flow from the new 
EU legal order that emerged after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
101
 Advocate 
General Kokott is more careful and does not follow the Commission’s interpretation. 
Perhaps even more interestingly, Kokott somewhat cryptically argued: 
 
[T]he very wide interpretation of the jurisdiction of the 
Courts of the EU which it proposes is just not necessary 
for the purpose of ensuring effective legal protection 
for individuals in the CFSP. This is because the—entirely 
accurate—assertion that neither the Member States 
nor the EU institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are 
in conformity with the Treaties as the basic 
constitutional charter does not necessarily always have 





The reason is that “national courts or tribunals have, and will retain, jurisdiction.”
103
 While 
we do not have reasons to deny this, the fact remains—as acknowledged by the Advocate 
General Kokott—that it is questionable whether the EU itself can provide effective legal 
protection in relation to CFSP. At least, the Court argued, “[A]s EU law now stands, certain 
acts adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review by the 
Court of Justice.”
104
 And it is this situation that provides the source of the Court’s worries. 
It points to a possibility of not only extending judicial review to CFSP by using the 
(Strasbourg) back door, but also to the idea of the ECtHR being able to rule on the 
compatibility with the ECHR of acts in cases where it would itself have no powers. A “non-
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EU body” would, thus, have powers that were consciously left out of the EU Treaties for 
the CJEU itself. In its opinion, the Court now also aims to prevent other Courts from saying 
something on possible human rights violations—if I don’t have the power, no-one else can 
have it. It is questionable whether this claim can be made. 
 
The question is whether the choice of the EU Treaty negotiators to maintain a special 
position for many CFSP norms as far as their judicial review is concerned implies that 
possible human rights violations in relation to CFSP actions should in general be exempt 
from judicial scrutiny. Arguably, the reason for the special EU arrangement was to prevent 
judicial activism in this area of EU competence. Particularly in the early days, the idea was 
to keep CFSP apart from the “community method” and (certain) Member States were 
hesitant to allow the Court a position in which it would be able to develop CFSP in 
unwelcome directions. It is questionable whether the Court of Justice can legitimately 
claim exclusive jurisdiction in this area. While the Lisbon Treaty may indeed have put the 
exclusion of the Court in relation to CFSP into perspective, there are still clear 
shortcomings and allowing the Strasbourg system to fill some of those gaps would have 
been a welcome improvement. Also for some Member States, it is not at all uncommon to 




Obviously, another way to get out of this dilemma would be to extend the Court’s 
jurisdiction in relation to CFSP.
106
 This would help to address the key “subsidiarity” issue 
mentioned by the Court: The need for an internal review of a Union act before that act is 
challenged before the ECHR.
107
 While the Lisbon Treaty already led to an (admittedly often 
implicit) inclusion of CFSP through the stronger connections between the different policy 
fields,
108
 this would nevertheless call for yet another treaty change; one that would 




                                            
105 In The Netherlands, for instance, both the absence of a constitutional court and the general impossibility of 
constitutional scrutiny have led the ECHR to fill that gap. 
106 It has even been suggested that “Opinion 2/13 could be seen as a strategic move of the ECJ to provoke such a 
modification of those unloved provisions of the Treaties that limit its judicial powers;” ‘Editorial Comments’, 52 
CMLRev. (2015), pp. 1-16 at 14. 
107 Admittedly, this point was already mentioned in para. 11 of Discussion Document of the Court, op.cit.  
108 See in particular C. Hillion, ‘A Powerless Court?’, op.cit. n. 96. 
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Having looked at the Opinion 2/13, it is fitting to analyze the consequences of the Court’s 
ruling. There is no doubt, Opinion 2/13 triggers an existential question, quo vadis? In the 
short term, the Court of Justice blocked the accession of the European Union to the ECHR. 
The Court took a much stronger position than Advocate General Kokott, who 
recommended that the Court clears the accession subject to a number of conditions being 
met. The judges opted for a nuclear button instead. Opinion 2/13, and the locks laid down 
therein, are likely to put the Court of Justice on a collision course with the Member States 
that have invested a lot of efforts into making the accession to the ECHR a reality; not to 
mention, the other parties to the Convention, who have spent a lot of time and energy 
debating the special position of the Union. At the same time, it is not surprising to see the 
Court of Justice once again taking a bold step to protect its exclusive jurisdiction. Through 
the years it has become a tradition that when a different court appears to be on the 
horizon, the judges in Luxembourg eliminate the competition in advance.
109
 For now, this 
means that the European Union will most likely ask everyone to come back to the drawing 
board and to re-open the negotiations of the Draft Accession Agreement. At the same 
time, the Court of Justice will be given a considerable amount of time to develop further its 
case law on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Obviously, this is highly dependent on the 
direct actions submitted to the Court and the preliminary rulings which come from the 
national courts. Still however, cases touching upon the Charter are destined to reach the 
Luxembourg courtrooms sooner rather than later. This, as argued earlier, will allow the 
Court of Justice to give additional thrust to the Charter, on the one hand, and to prove that 
it is taking fundamental rights seriously, on the other. Both consequences of Opinion 2/13 
are analyzed in turn.  
 
II. Back to the Drawing Board? Options for Renegotiation of the Draft Accession Agreement 
 
One thing that did not change with Opinion 2/13 is that the European Union remains under 
a self-imposed obligation to accede to the ECHR as per Article 6(2) TEU. Since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty it is no longer a choice. Obviously, Article 6(2) TEU does not 
mention a time frame, so theoretically the provision could be ignored for a long time and 
perhaps even indefinitely. The Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, would be the 
one to note the omission, however it would not only need to have the Member States on 
board, but it would also need to have a clear perspective on a possible way out. At the 
same time, EU institutions could be sued for a ‘failure to act’ as per Article 265 TFEU. Again 
however, while these options are legally interesting, they are most likely politically 
unrealistic. 
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While the possibility of solving certain points on the basis of interpretative declarations 
should not be excluded, it is questionable whether this will suffice to meet the Court’s 
quite fundamental objections. It has been argued by Kuijper that “[i]t is not the text of the 
Accession Agreement itself that is contrary to the TFEU, but rather the use and the 
interpretation of the Agreement that the institutions and the Member Sates could make of 
the Agreement or the gaps that are left in it.”
110
 On the basis of a number of internal and 
external declarations and interpretations, a renegotiation could then be avoided. In 
Kuijper’s view these declarations could, for instance, state that the Member States will not 
avail themselves of their right to go beyond the level of protection required by the ECHR; 
provided that could put the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law in danger. Similarly, 
disconnection declarations could make clear that in their internal (EU law related) 
disputes, the EU and its Member States will apply the ECHR in accordance with the Union’s 
internal rules. Finally, in relation to the prior involvement procedure, the Member States 
could declare that the procedure would be used only exceptionally and under the strictest 
observance of the requirements of EU law. While Kuijper claims that these types of 
declarations should constitute sufficient guarantee for the Court, one may wonder 
whether this is the case, given the quite fundamental nature of some of the Court’s 
objections. In a way, elements of these solutions were also present in the View of the 
Advocate General Kokott, which obviously did not convince the Court. At the same time, it 
is questionable whether for instance disconnection declarations would be acceptable to 
the non-EU parties to the Convention. Such declarations hint at the application of different 
standards for a selected group of states, and also imply the supremacy of internal 
“domestic” law—something that is again contrary to the rationale of the ECHR. 
 
If one looks at Article 218(11) TFEU, on which the Opinion is based, the options are 
twofold. First, the EU may request re-negotiation of the Draft Accession Agreement. 
Second, it may change the Founding Treaties to accommodate the negotiated text. The 
latter option was considered, inter alia, by Besselink, who proposed to draft a 
“Notwithstanding Protocol.”
111
 According to Besselink the following text would be 
advisable: “‘The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notwithstanding Article 6(2) Treaty on 
European Union, Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union 
and Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014.” Although it is an 
interesting proposition, it is argued that modifying Article 6 TEU, in order to sideline the 
Court’s Opinion, may not be the best step forward in cases like these. Especially when one 
takes into account the somewhat reduced appetite among the Member States for further 
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Treaty revisions. All in all, this option, although intellectually sound and tempting, in reality 
may turn into a political fantasy.  
 
A more limited modification would be to change Protocol No 8 as to allow for accession 
despite the Court’s limited jurisdiction in relation to CFSP. One could argue that this should 
not meet any resistance on the side of the Member States because they already agreed 
that the Draft Accession Agreement was compatible with the ECHR. This would certainly 
not make the Court happy, but as Herren der Verträge, the Member States’ wishes are in 
the end decisive. While it has been argued that the CFSP issue would be the most difficult 
issue to overcome,
112
 the current political climate in Europe does not at all guarantee a 
speedy treaty modification. Also, it may be difficult to isolate this issue from other ones on 
the table. 
 
The only way forward seems to be a return to the drawing board and to renegotiate the 
Draft Accession Agreement.
113
 Judging by the experience thus far, it will be a rather 
tortuous exercise that is likely to take time. It will provide the Court of Justice a chance to 
continue building its line of case law based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and, in 
the long run, minimize the direct impact of the Strasbourg Court on EU law. No doubt, 
opening the agreed text of the Draft Accession Agreement for further negotiation will not 
be welcomed by some the Member States, as well as by several non-EU parties to the 
ECHR. One need only be reminded of, for instance, the reaction by the Russian delegation 
when a number of EU Member States suggested to reopen negotiations because they 
could not live with an earlier draft: 
 
Now, because of the internal problems of the EU, we 
have received amendments from our European Union 
colleagues. We are going to study them with great care. 
But the fact is these amendments reopen the agreed 
draft. Therefore, we will look at the EU proposals 
having in mind that we will also have the right to 
present our own amendments to the draft that was 
agreed by the CDDH Working Group, as well as to the 
documents circulated by the EU. We assume that our 
possible proposals will have the same status as the 
draft amendments proposed by the EU. We hope as 
well that future negotiations will really be negotiations 
between 47 individual member States and the 
                                            
112 ‘Editorial Comments’, 52 CMLRev. (2015), op.cit., n. 106, at 12. 
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European Commission and not between a ‘European 





One way out of this could be to use the possibility of reservations mentioned in Article 57 
ECHR:  
 
Any State may, when signing this Convention or when 
depositing its instrument of ratification, make a 
reservation in respect of any particular provision of the 
Convention to the extent that any law then in force in 
its territory is not in conformity with the provision. 
Reservations of a general character shall not be 
permitted under this Article. 
 
It is particularly the latter sentence that may cause problems in this regard. While it may, 
for instance, be tempting to exclude CFSP from the ECtHR’s jurisdiction, by including it in a 




For many Member States the opinion of the Court was not a welcome development. 
Though, for some Member States, in particular the UK, the opinion may have led to a sigh 
of relief.
 116
 At the same time, for the negotiators, particularly those from the European 
Commission, setting a new negotiation agenda will be the first challenge to be addressed. 
It goes without saying that finding a balanced compromise will inevitably pose certain 
difficulties. One key question remains: How to satisfy the Court’s demands without 
undermining the raison d’être behind accession? In the end, this will not only be a question 
on the EU side, but also for the ECtHR, which will no doubt have thoughts on whether the 
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III. Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
One of the consequences of Opinion 2/13 is that for the foreseeable future the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights formally remains the EU’s only bill of rights. Its presence is evident 
throughout the opinion, particularly in the general section that opens up the analysis 
proper. In a symbolic move the judges seem to have elevated the Charter in their discourse 
as if they were aiming to prove that the Court of Justice takes fundamental rights seriously, 
and that adequate guarantees are provided within the Charter as well as in general 
principles of EU law—as per Article 6 TEU. When the Charter entered into force on 1 
December 2009 it was to a fair degree terra incognita. Back then, as D. Sarmiento puts it, 
“the prospects of a revolutionary impact in EU law were far from clear”.
118
 It is 
unquestionable that the Court of Justice has gone a long way from a mere en passant 
reference in Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci
119
 to, what some may call, shooting from the 
hip as in Cases C-399/11 Melloni
120
 and C-617/10 Fransson.
121
 Undoubtedly, the Charter is 
now a persuasive source of rights that EU judicial institutions are ready to invoke.
122
 It 
merits attention that a great majority of judgments dealing with the Charter are 
preliminary rulings submitted to the Court of Justice by domestic courts. The Charter has 
also been invoked in actions for annulment;
123
 furthermore it has already served as a 
yardstick for review of legality under article 267 TFEU.
124
 However, the European 
Commission has been quite reluctant to invoke the Charter in infraction proceedings based 
on Articles 258 and 260 TFEU. As argued by one of the present authors elsewhere, this 
trepidation is not accidental, but rather a well thought policy choice which takes into 
account the lack of clarity stemming from Article 51 which regulates the scope of 
application of the Charter.
125
  It is yet to be seen how the clarification provided in the 
already mentioned case C-617/10 Fransson will make a difference in this respect.  
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Arguably, the coming years will allow the Court of Justice to explore the Charter and its 
potential even further. To venture into fortune telling would exceed the limits of this 
article, therefore we will limit ourselves to a few issues that are most likely to reach the 
Court of Justice. To start with, one should expect further clarification on the scope of 
application of the Charter. Article 51 makes it clear that it is binding on EU institutions, but 
on the Member States “only when they are implementing Union law.” As already alluded 
to, the latter phrase is rather ambiguous and in case C-617/10 Fransson, the Court of 
Justice clarified it as follows:  
 
Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter 
must […] be complied with where national legislation 
falls within the scope of European Union law, situations 
cannot exist which are covered in that way by 
European Union law without those fundamental rights 
being applicable. The applicability of European Union 
law entails applicability of the fundamental rights 




Although this conclusion was controversial and the application of the Charter to the case at 
hand went against the will of the Member States, it did send, together with message in 
case Melloni, an important signal to the legal community and EU citizens alike. The Court of 
Justice was willing to apply the Charter of Fundamental Rights extensively and to use its 
potential as primary law to the full extent.
127
 Arguably, it seized the opportunity to start 
building a wall of case law based on the Charter before the European Union accedes to the 
ECHR. Looked at from this perspective, Opinion 2/13 is undoubtedly an important element 
in this jigsaw puzzle. As already mentioned, in the most recent jurisprudence, including 
Opinion 2/13, the Court of Justice returned to the notion of “implementing EU law”. It is 
questionable if this is in reaction to the criticism that followed the ruling in Fransson, or 
perhaps the Court did not pay much attention to the matter in hand.  
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights still remains a bit of enigma when it comes to its 
enforcement in national courts. Although in Melloni, the Court of Justice extended the 
doctrine of primacy to the Charter. It is yet to be seen if other tenets of EU law are 
applicable, as well. This includes the well-established doctrines of direct and indirect 
                                            
126 Para. 21. 
127 See further E. Hancox The meaning of “implementing” EU law under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Åkerberg 
Fransson, 50 CMLRev. (2013) 1411. 
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effect
128
 as well as state liability.
129
 The Court of Justice is also likely to be asked to focus on 
the substance of rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The time gained 
by the rejection of the accession to the ECHR definitely increases the chances in this 
respect. One should note, although, that while some of those rights may reach the Court, 
some are very unlikely to do so. As far as the former are concerned, one should not be 
surprised to see future cases, particularly references for preliminary ruling dealing with the 
social rights regulated in the Charter. Furthermore, Article 47 of the Charter, which 
guarantees effective judicial protection, may reach the Luxembourg courtrooms.
130
 For the 
latter, Article 45 of the Charter is a questionable provision the Court of Justice is going to 
be troubled with. Because the free movement of persons is thoroughly regulated in the 







Opinion 2/13 is without a shadow of the doubt one of the most important rulings of the 
Court of Justice, certainly not one of the evanescent ones. It has already triggered a heated 
debate and it is likely to continue to do so in the years to come. In simple terms, the judges 
in Luxembourg blocked the accession of the European Union to the ECHR at least for a 
number of years. They set their conditions out rather clearly but the question that remains 
is if such guarantees are negotiable to the Court’s satisfaction. As argued in this article, to 
achieve a consensus with non-EU countries which are parties to the ECHR appears, at least 
prima facie, to be a potentially uphill struggle. For instance, the current political climate in 
EU relations with Russia or Turkey is not favorable by any stretch of imagination. Hence, to 
engage both countries in negotiations of nitty-gritty technicalities may not be the best 
idea. It boils down to a more general question of whether the demands made by the Court 
of Justice are a “ransom” worth paying for. Arguably, the caveats laid down by the drafters 
of the Treaty of Lisbon have been turned into locks, or, to put it differently, they are 
conditio sine qua non for future approval of the revised Accession Agreement.  
 
The arguments made by the Court are so fundamental that one wonders if the negotiators 
saw it coming. Ensuring that the EU would be subject to external norms on fundamental 
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rights was the whole purpose of joining the Strasbourg system, and it is inconceivable to 
think that only now that the Court seems to realize the impact. As we have seen, the 
Presidents of the two courts have issued joint statements; and they have no doubt 
addressed the issues during their regular (at least bi-annual) judicial dialogues.
132
 
Furthermore, a representative of the Court of Justice was present during the discussions 
on the negotiations, in the capacity of an observer.
133
 At the same time the Registrar and 
Deputy Registrar of the ECHR participated in the negotiating group.
134
 One may assume 
that most of the issues raised by the Court of Justice in its opinion have at some stage been 
part of the debates. Yet, it is indeed also a mater of interpretation. After all, not only the 
European Commission in presenting its views, but also the Advocate General Kokott, came 
to different conclusions on the basis of the same facts. 
 
Against this background and given the interpretative margins, our conclusion is that the 
Court had a choice. Instead of turning to its natural risk-averse strategy, it could have 
started by trusting not only the Strasbourg system, the case law of which has already 
largely influenced EU law, but also the Member States, which by now have been trained to 
understand the nature of both EU law and the connected jurisdiction of the Court. 
Accepting an—indeed somewhat—subordinate role the Court could have sent a message 
that it has itself so often sent to its own Member States: Be willing to accept an 
interpretation of your domestic law in the light of overarching fundamental principles.
135
 
Except, in a way the Court held on to the view it presented in Opinion 1/91 (EEA) and 
Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court).
136
 It is not that the Court is not willing to submit 
itself to an external court, it simply does not allow that court to affect the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU to decide on internal disputes or to have the competence to 
interpret EU law. 
 
Finally, will it make sense to try and “unlock” the situation? Arguably it does.
137
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Irrespective of the further (and important) developments and use of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the accession of the EU to the ECHR will have a number of important 
implications. First, in the light of the continuing transfer of competences rights of 
individuals will be better guaranteed when the acts of the EU Institutions are subject to the 
same scrutiny as the acts of Member States’ organs. Second, the current state of 
constitutional development of the EU legal order not only allows for, but perhaps even 
demands, external scrutiny. The EU should be self-confident enough to accept external 
checks and balances, and—more importantly—accept criticism in the case where things 
are not up to standards. Third, accession will contribute to more uniformity in the rights 
that are to be respected by all actors involved and will prevent the CJEU and the ECtHR to 
develop diverging interpretations on the same or similar provisions. Fourth, a continued 
protection of its own jurisdiction by the CJEU in this area may trigger domestic 
Constitutional Courts to do the same.
138
 Finally, with further development of the Union’s 
external action, fundamental rights are in need of protection when they are related to 
CFSP.
139
 It is one thing to prevent judicial activism in that area; it is quite another thing to 
deliberately leave gaps in the protection of fundamental rights. 
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